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In neuroimaging experiments, the scientific concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are each 
used as tools that are independent of the other; uses that simultaneously reflect and obscure the 
enduring historical connections between these concepts. Examining one of these connections suggests 
that these independent uses share interdependent associations about the role of appropriately-
regulated sensory-like mental phenomena (SLMP) in thought. In this paper, I will argue that identifying 
historical connections such as this is a crucial step in understanding how these concepts are each used 
as goal-directed tools that can contribute to neuroimaging experiments. 
 
My approach to analysing mental imagery and hallucinations draws upon a range of historical and 
philosophical studies that each examine how scientific concepts are used as tools that can enable 
scientific practices (e.g., Boon 2012; Feest 2010; Steinle 2012). Many of these approaches examine the 
historical development of scientific concepts in ways that can help to understand how the types of 
questions pursued by experiments cohere with specific epistemic situations (Steinle 2002, 410). In line 
with this, I seek to build on scholarship that demonstrates that concepts are used for pursuing 
historically situated epistemic goals (e.g., Brigandt 2010, 2012; Steinle 2012). 
 
To this end, I will focus on highlighting how enduring connections between the historical uses of these 
two concepts might contribute to understanding their current uses as independent experimental tools. 
The separate developmental trajectories of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations concepts 
have been detailed elsewhere and are beyond the present scope (e.g., Berrios and Marková 2012; 
MacKisack et al. 2016).} I will begin by outlining how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations 
can both be understood as tools that enable the investigation of discrete types of SLMP in relation to 
separate epistemic goals. On the one hand, mental imagery is used as a concept for investigating those 
ordinary SLMP experiences that resemble perception in ways that can aid in various neurocognitive 
functions. On the other hand, hallucinations provide the dominant concept for investigating abnormal 
SLMPs – specifically, those SLMP that are so compellingly like perception that they indicate 
dysfunctional neurocognition. The goal of using each concept is to find a unique mechanism explaining 
the discrete type to SLMP being investigated. That the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations 
can be used independently of each other in this way is usually taken for granted. However, this obscures 
that each concept stabilised as a tool for individuating discrete types of SLMP through unresolved 
attempts to characterise the inverse relationship between functional and dysfunctional SLMP.  While my 
focus is on historical connections that helped stabilise these ‘phenomenal’ concepts, both continue to 
be refined in novel ways that warrant further examination. 
 
Examining this connection between how mental imagery and hallucinations each came to be 
characterised draws attention to the shared set of associations about functional and dysfunctional SLMP 
evident in their respective historical developments. This shared set of associations can be traced back to 
an old philosophical tradition that positions ordinary SLMP as a required mediator between perception 
and thought. During the nineteenth century, this mediator-view of SLMP provided the available 
knowledge within which the concept of mental imagery began to be used to investigate the role of 
ordinary SLMP in memory and imagination; as well as for the proposed concept of hallucinations as a 
description of how memories and imaginations could become ‘over-excited’ and lead to failures in 
reason or judgement. In the following debates, inverse sets of ‘typical’ characteristics of functional and 
dysfunctional SLMP were proposed to explain how something required for thought (mental imagery) 
could lead to a failure to correctly reason or judge perception (hallucinations). Despite unresolved 
questions about their validity, these inverse characterisations became routine; carrying-along the 
interdependent associations connecting ordinary and dysfunctional SLMP even after the mediator-view 
of SLMP itself was abandoned during the early twentieth century. 
 
Drawing on recent historical and philosophical accounts of concept-use, these interdependent 
associations can be described as sediment – implicit associations persisting long after the initial available 
knowledge justifying them has been abandoned – that operates as a base for the dynamic uses of these 
concepts as goal-directed tool in current neuroimaging practices. In offering examples to illustrate this 
final point, I aim to demonstrate how examining these enduring historical connections is an important 
step in understanding how the uses of these two concepts contribute to neuroimaging experiments. 
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